Nos derniers articles

"From a #riskmanagement perspective, it is challenging to #model physical and #transitionrisks given the #uncertainty around #climaterisk drivers, such as changes in #governmentpolicy aimed at reducing #greenhousegasemissions, the pace of technological change, and uncertainty around the transmission channels. A dearth of in-house modeling tools and reliance on #thirdparty vendors also hamper #banks’ ability to properly understand and manage #risks. The most recent #boe climate biennial exploratory scenario (#cbes) noted that “banks varied in their ability to scrutinize and understand the strengths and weakness of third-party models, and adapt them appropriately to the CBES.” As a result, projected #losses for banks varied widely, suggesting a high degree of uncertainty about the magnitude of climate risks as well as a limited ability to accurately reflect such risks in business decisions."

This study investigates the factors affecting the #capitaladequacy of commercial #banks in #bangladesh using panel data from 28 banks over the period of 2013-2019. The study employs three analytical methods, including the Fixed Effect model, Random Effect model, and Pooled Ordinary Least Square (POLS) method, to analyze the Capital Adequacy Ratio (#car) and #tier1#capitalratio. The study finds that capital adequacy is significantly influenced by several factors, including #leverage, #liquidityrisk, #realgdp, net profit, size, and #inflation.

"#banks that did well in the #gfc also did well in the #pandemic while banks that did poorly during the GFC also did poorly during the pandemic."

"This article discusses the recent bank failures of #svb and #signaturebank and analyzes the balance sheets of these banks to determine if they were outliers or if they represent a systemic problem in #riskmanagement... Our analysis suggests that SVB and Signature were not representative of the canary in the coal mine and that they do not represent the average risk among #banks, but a classic #bankrun run cannot be precluded."

It highlights the increasing #regulatory focus on #climaterisk faced by #canada's #banks, both domestically through the #osfi and globally through the adoption of guidelines proposed by the #tcfd. As regulators seek to impose more #monitoring, #disclosure, and mitigation obligations on #financialinstitutions, the article raises whether banks' #capitalrequirements should be increased to reflect the #risks associated with #climatechange.

"... this paper argues that recent #eu#regulatory reform to #corporategovernance, as a means to improve #financialstability is a large-scale intellectual fallacy. Absent EU-wide structural reform to control #risktaking in large and complex #financialinstitutions, the stability of the EU #bankingsector will remain compromised. Smaller and less interconnected #banks will both improve bank corporate governance and create a safer and more stable #financialsector."

This paper proposes a #credit#portfolio approach for evaluating #systemicrisk and attributing it across #financialinstitutions. The proposed model can be estimated from high-frequency credit default swap (#cds) data and captures risks from publicly traded #banks, privately held institutions, and coöperative banks. The approach overcomes limitations of earlier studies by accounting for correlated losses between institutions and also offers a modeling extension to account for #fattails and #skewness of #assetreturns. The model is applied to a universe of banks in #europe, highlighting discrepancies between the #capitaldequacy of the largest contributors to systemic risk and less systemically important banks.

"... model uncertainty is a vital component of the current challenges in risk measurement, and therefore the regulator should design risk measures encouraging well-understood prudent decisions over (less understood) risky ones. From this perspective robust regulation should be a desirable goal. To achieve such an objective, simple – but not simpler – rules are needed."

Proposes a set of novel modeling mechanisms to regulate the size of banks' macroprudential capital buffers by using market-based estimates of systemic risk combined with a structural framework for credit risk assessment. It applies the model to the European banking sector and finds differences with the capital buffers currently assigned by national regulators, which have substantial implications for systemic risk in the EEA.

Proposes a new framework for regulating operational threats such as damage to physical assets, business disruption, and system failures. It suggests replacing rwa regulation with simple buffers of equity and outlines what a "macro-operational" approach to banking supervision might look like. It also acknowledges the limitations of macro-operational supervision and considers what new types of operations-specific emergency tools might need to be devised in response.