Nos derniers articles

The article presents three key arguments on #risktaking in #corporategovernance. Firstly, it asserts that #riskmanagers shouldn't be automatically blamed for corporate failures arising from statistically justified risk-based decisions. It suggests a "statistics-based governance" rule to protect managers within legal limits. Secondly, it argues for the inclusion of statistical methodologies to offset #cognitivebias in assessing prudent corporate #governance. Lastly, it contends that while expected-value analysis guides most decisions, for those with potential societal harm, public interests should also be considered.

Outsiders in #bank#boards improve #riskgovernance (decrease #risktaking, increase #riskmonitoring) for #regulatory#riskmeasures but worsen risk governance for economic risk measures.

"... this paper argues that recent #eu#regulatory reform to #corporategovernance, as a means to improve #financialstability is a large-scale intellectual fallacy. Absent EU-wide structural reform to control #risktaking in large and complex #financialinstitutions, the stability of the EU #bankingsector will remain compromised. Smaller and less interconnected #banks will both improve bank corporate governance and create a safer and more stable #financialsector."

"... banks with shorter employee tenures and higher fractions of MBAs, top school graduates, and job jumpers performed more poorly during the Great Recession. This relation is driven by the predisposition of these banks to take on greater risk."

"We find that bank capital and probability of default PD impact each other, where the total influence of the latter on the former is stronger. PD also affects capital via risk-taking but the opposite effect (i.e., from capital to PD via risk) is not identified, which challenges one of the main assumptions underlying capital regulation."