4 résultats pour « gametheory »

Can Nash inform capital requirements? Allocating systemic risk measures

This study introduces a novel capital allocation mechanism for banks, using game theory to assign capital requirements while enforcing macro-prudential standards. Based on competition for lower requirements, the approach employs insensitive risk measures from Chen et al. (2013) and Kromer et al. (2016), typically yielding a unique Nash allocation rule, while sensitive measures from Feinstein et al. (2017) may need additional conditions for uniqueness. The Eisenberg-Noe (2001) clearing system is analyzed for systemic risk, with numerical Nash allocations demonstrated. The study claims that further investigation into properties like continuity, monotonicity, or convexity is needed, noting that not all can hold simultaneously due to firm interactions.

Risk Sharing in Blockchain‑Based Insurance with Costs

This study examines the #riskallocation problem in distributed #insurance using #blockchaintechnology, considering different charging methods. Through #gametheory analysis, the research explores the #pareto optimal risk allocation method. The findings reveal that when charges occur during insurance signing, risk is proportionally distributed based on policyholders' #riskaversion coefficient. However, if the platform provider charges a fee proportional to the premium or actual risk, policyholders bear increased risk from others while their own risk is reduced, leading to decreased overall utility. These conclusions provide valuable insights for #blockchain insurance companies regarding user #riskmanagement and allocation.

A Primer on Anomaly and Fraud Detection in Blockchain Networks

"... blockchain networks are vulnerable to anomalies and frauds that can have serious consequences for the integrity and security of these networks. In this primer, we provide an overview of the definition and properties of blockchain technology, and discuss the types and examples of anomalies and frauds that occur in these networks."

Risk sharing in equity‑linked insurance products: Stackelberg equilibrium

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"Stackelberg game. The reinsurer is the leader in the game and maximizes its expected utility by selecting its optimal investment strategy and a safety loading in the reinsurance contract it offers to the insurer. The reinsurer can assess how the insurer will rationally react on each action of the reinsurer. The insurance company is the follower and maximizes its expected utility by choosing its investment strategy and the amount of reinsurance the company purchases at the price offered by the reinsurer. "