This paper presents a unified framework for reinsurance markets with multiple insurers and reinsurers, using Choquet risk measures and nonlinear pricing. It identifies Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium as the optimal concept, proving contracts are rational and Pareto optimal, with insurer welfare gains over monopoly scenarios.
This study introduces a novel capital allocation mechanism for banks, using game theory to assign capital requirements while enforcing macro-prudential standards. Based on competition for lower requirements, the approach employs insensitive risk measures from Chen et al. (2013) and Kromer et al. (2016), typically yielding a unique Nash allocation rule, while sensitive measures from Feinstein et al. (2017) may need additional conditions for uniqueness. The Eisenberg-Noe (2001) clearing system is analyzed for systemic risk, with numerical Nash allocations demonstrated. The study claims that further investigation into properties like continuity, monotonicity, or convexity is needed, noting that not all can hold simultaneously due to firm interactions.
This study explores cyber risk in businesses, suggesting cybersecurity investment and insurance as key strategies. Using a network model, it examines firms' interconnected decisions, defining a Nash equilibrium where firms optimize cybersecurity and insurance. Findings highlight their interdependence and how network structures affect choices, reinforced by numerical analyses.