Nos derniers articles

This study introduces a novel capital allocation mechanism for banks, using game theory to assign capital requirements while enforcing macro-prudential standards. Based on competition for lower requirements, the approach employs insensitive risk measures from Chen et al. (2013) and Kromer et al. (2016), typically yielding a unique Nash allocation rule, while sensitive measures from Feinstein et al. (2017) may need additional conditions for uniqueness. The Eisenberg-Noe (2001) clearing system is analyzed for systemic risk, with numerical Nash allocations demonstrated. The study claims that further investigation into properties like continuity, monotonicity, or convexity is needed, noting that not all can hold simultaneously due to firm interactions.

This paper defines vector-valued risk measures using axioms and shows they ignore dependence structures of input random vectors, unlike set-valued risk measures. Convex vector-valued risk measures are unsuitable for capital allocation in various financial applications, including systemic risk measures. The results also generalize to conditional settings.