Nos derniers articles

The paper applies an extended mean-field game framework to model policyholder behavior in a large mutual insurance company, where surplus/deficit is shared among members. It proves global existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, characterized by constrained MF-FBSDEs, and solves these numerically using a modified deep BSDE algorithm. Key findings include: insurance demand rises with risk aversion, loss volatility, and surplus-sharing ratio; optimal coverage decreases toward the horizon; practical no-short-selling constraints reduce wealth disparities; and pool composition affects all members’ strategies through interdependence. Extensions to survival models and decentralized insurance are proposed.

"We mathematically demonstrate how and what it means for two collective pension funds to mutually insure one another against systematic longevity risk. The key equation that facilitates the exchange of insurance is a market clearing condition. This enables an insurance market to be established even if the two funds face the same mortality risk, so long as they have different risk preferences. Provided the preferences of the two funds are not too dissimilar, insurance provides little benefit, implying the base scheme is effectively optimal. When preferences vary significantly, insurance can be beneficial."